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1 
Response Article 
A Better Solution to Moral Hazard in 
Employment Arbitration: It Is Time to Ban 
Predispute Binding Arbitration Clauses 
Lisa Blomgren Bingham† and David Henning 
Good‡ 
Mandatory arbitration is a neologism that describes the 
capacity of an economically stronger repeat player to impose an 
adhesive binding arbitration clause on the weaker, usually one-
shot, player. Such agreements appear frequently as a condition 
of some economic relationship, most problematically employ-
ment, consumer purchases, or health care.1 Employers and 
businesses adopt adhesive arbitration clauses as a means to 
manage the risk of litigation and perceived “runaway” jury 
awards.2 Professor Michael LeRoy, together with his colleague 
Professor Peter Feuille, has made a series of important empiri-
cal and substantive contributions to the dialogue and contro-
versy.3 In his recent article appearing in the Minnesota Law 
 
†  Keller-Runden Professor of Public Service, Indiana University School 
of Public and Environmental Affairs, Bloomington, Indiana.   
‡  Associate Professor of Public and Environmental Affairs and Director 
of the Transportation Research Center, Indiana University School of Public 
and Environmental Affairs, Bloomington, Indiana. Copyright © 2009 by Lisa 
Blomgren Bingham and David Henning Good. 
 1. For reviews of the literature, see Michael H. LeRoy, Do Courts Create 
Moral Hazard?: When Judges Nullify Employer Liability in Arbitrations, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 998, 1001 n.13 (2009). 
 2. Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory 
Commercial Arbitration, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 
221, 221–23 (arguing that repeat players that control the design of arbitration 
systems manage risk by shifting transaction costs to the one-shot player to re-
duce the settlement value of a case and discourage litigation). 
 3. Michael H. LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something: When Women Pre-
vail in Employment Arbitration Awards, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 573, 573–
81 (2005); Michael H. LeRoy, Jury Revival or Jury Reviled? When Employees 
Are Compelled to Waive Jury Trials, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 767, 767–72 
(2005); Michael H. LeRoy, Misguided Fairness? Regulating Arbitration by Sta-
tute: Empirical Evidence of Declining Award Finality, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
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Review,4 Professor LeRoy outlines the debate over mandatory 
arbitration and proposes another way to view the developing 
and divided case law: that courts create conditions of moral ha-
zard by vacating arbitration awards that employees win.  
Professor LeRoy reviews the grounds for overturning an 
arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act,5 Labor 
Management Relations Act,6 Uniform Arbitration Act,7 Revised 
Uniform Arbitration Act,8 and common law standards of review 
devised by federal courts and imported into the jurisprudence 
of state courts.9 He argues that courts effectively serve as an 
insurance plan for employers, protecting them against liability 
for their own wrongdoing in violating state or federal employ-
ment law.10 Reporting data showing that state trial and appel-
late courts overturn arbitration awards favoring employees at a 
slightly higher frequency than they do awards favoring em-
ployers, Professor LeRoy argues for a twofold solution: (1) re-
turn to strict enforcement of the four limited grounds for over-
turning an award specified in the Federal Arbitration Act, and 
(2) require employers to pay the relief ordered by the arbitrator 
before proceeding to hear a motion to vacate the award. This 
second prescription makes a good deal of sense given Professor 
LeRoy’s review of the case law and regardless of the data.  
However, we argue that the data do not support Professor 
LeRoy’s first recommendation, and that enforcing the narrow 
FAA review standards will not address the many abuses pre-
sented by mandatory arbitration. With all due respect, there is 
another way. Just ban predispute arbitration clauses in em-
ployment and consumer disputes; do it now. It is an elegant so-
lution. It rescues public law that has been put at risk by the 
 
551 (2008); Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Bar-
rier to Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory 
Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143, 143–44 (2002). 
 4. LeRoy, supra note 1. 
 5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2006). 
 6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141−144 (1947). 
 7. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12 (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 497 (1956). 
 8. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23, 7 U.L.A. 73−83 (2000).  
 9. See LeRoy, supra note 1, at 1022. 
 10. Predispute employment-arbitration clauses cover claims of discrimi-
nation based on race, sex, age, disability, religion, or other grounds; claims of 
wrongful or retaliatory discharge for reports that are protected by public poli-
cy; intentional infliction of emotional distress; breach of implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing; breach of express contract; and a number of other 
claims. For an empirical report on these claims, see Lisa B. Bingham, Emerg-
ing Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration, 47 LAB. L.J. 108 (1996).  
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unchecked growth of mandatory arbitration. It regulates the 
“wild west” processes creative counsel are designing to manage 
risk on behalf of their clients. It brings us back from almost two 
decades of a laissez faire, failed approach to balancing the great 
value of binding arbitration with the potential for its abuse in 
the hands of the economically powerful.  
In this commentary we first address the data Professor 
LeRoy cites in support of his argument. We supply additional 
analyses of his tables to explore the strength of his findings. We 
address the degree to which these findings support his recom-
mendation to enforce FAA standards universally. Next, we ex-
amine the proposals to return fairness to arbitration as an al-
ternative solution to the policy issue of mandatory arbitration. 
We conclude that the FAA, as the Supreme Court has inter-
preted it lately, is the problem and not the solution. The solu-
tion is legislation to ban predispute arbitration agreements for 
employment, health care, and consumer disputes. 
I.  A CLOSER LOOK AT THE DATA: LESS THAN MEETS 
THE EYE   
Professor LeRoy used online databases of federal and state 
cases involving arbitrations between individual employees and 
employers with cases decided between 1975 and 2007, a period 
encompassing thirty-three years.11 He identified 267 cases in 
which employment arbitration awards were challenged in fed-
eral or state court, an average of eight cases a year. In addition, 
he examined appellate-court decisions in 176 cases, for a total 
sample of 443 cases. Professor LeRoy reports four tables for 
federal district court (160 cases), state trial court (107 cases), 
federal appellate court (83 cases), and state appellate court (93 
cases) cases. First, he codes cases by whether the employee 
won, the employer won, or the award was split. Second, he 
codes cases by whether the court confirmed the award, partly 
confirmed it, or vacated it. He then uses a chi-square analysis 
to examine the pattern of case frequencies across two dimen-
sions.12 He finds no significant results in the federal district 
 
 11. See LeRoy, supra note 1, at 1044. 
 12. Chi-square can be problematic when there are fewer than five obser-
vations expected to fall into cells of the table. See Shelby J. Haberman, A 
Warning on the Use of Chi-Squared Statistics with Frequency Tables with 
Small Expected Cell Counts, 83 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 555, 555–60 (1988). In 
practice, one or two cells violating this rule of thumb is not serious but roughly 
half of the cells violate this guideline across the four tables. A better test is 
Fisher’s Exact Test, which in this case yields slightly different probability val-
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courts. He finds that federal appellate courts are more likely to 
vacate awards when employers win, but that state trial and 
appellate courts are more likely to vacate awards when em-
ployees win.  
However, the mere fact that a distribution departs syste-
matically from what we would expect were it random does not 
mean that this departure is either substantial or one upon 
which to base important policy decisions. Professor LeRoy’s ar-
gument relies largely on Tables 2 and 4, which reflect state 
court cases. In each table, he compares the number of employer 
wins and employee wins that the court vacates. In Table 2, 
state trial courts vacate six employer wins and ten employee 
wins. The absolute difference in frequency is thus a total of four 
cases over a period of thirty-three years in the state trial 
courts. In Table 4, state appellate courts vacated five employer 
wins and ten employee wins, for a difference in frequency of 
five cases over a period of thirty-three years in the state appel-
late courts. By converting these very low frequencies into per-
centages,13 Professor LeRoy argues that state appellate courts 
“vacated many more wins for employees than for employers.”14 
However, in essence, Professor LeRoy’s argument boils 
down to a claim that four cases in state trial courts or five cases 
in state appellate courts over a period of thirty-three years is 
enough of a pattern (1) to be obvious to employer counsel and 
(2) to induce them to use the courts as insurance against their 
own liability. This is highly unlikely. Professor LeRoy himself 
observes, “My empirical study does not measure employer res-
ponses to court rulings that vacate pro-worker awards.”15 
Moreover, his data suggest the overwhelmingly strong tenden-
cy of courts to confirm arbitration awards, without regard to 
which party won in arbitration.16 
 
ues for each table, but does not change the substantive results. The p value for 
Table 1 changes from .724 to .709, still not significant. The p value for Table 2 
changes from .010 to .028, which is still significant. The p value for Table 3 
changes from .008 to .009, still significant. The p value for Table 4 changes 
from .032 to .018, still significant. 
 13. See LeRoy, supra note 1, at 1048 (“Table 4 illustrates that state courts 
confirmed 86.7% of pro-employer awards but only 56.4% of employee wins at 
arbitration.”). 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 1010. 
 16. See id. at 1045–46 tbls.1, 2, 3, & 4. The tables’ first columns are so 
heavily skewed in terms of confirming awards that the most likely outcome 
that any plaintiff would expect is confirmation of the award, regardless of the 
winner, regardless of the court. Two measures of association which describe 
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In sum, the evidence that courts create conditions of moral 
hazard by insuring employers against adverse arbitration 
awards is weak. The data show that it continues to be difficult 
for either party to overturn a binding arbitration award, 
whether in federal or state court and regardless of the standard 
of review. The majority of courts confirm the majority of 
awards, whether employer or employee wins. 
II. MORAL HAZARD AT THE POINT OF MOTIONS TO 
VACATE IS NOT THE PROBLEM, AND NARROWING 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IS NOT THE SOLUTION   
On the theory of moral hazard for employers and reasoning 
that, even when they lose in court, employers as repeat players 
acquire strategic advantage from the arbitration experience,17 
Professor LeRoy proposes two solutions. First, he proposes to 
address the abuses he documents in individual case descrip-
tions of courts throwing out awards favoring employees by re-
quiring that employers pay up front when they seek to chal-
lenge an adverse award.18 This is an excellent proposal fully 
justified by Professor LeRoy’s review of the case law. 
 
the strength of the relationship in this case are Lambda (which treats both the 
arbitration winner and court decision as nominal) and Somers’ D (which treats 
both arbitration winner and court decision as ordinal, with partial awards and 
partial confirmations as middle categories). In the case of Lambda, none of the 
relationships between outcomes in the tables have any predictive strength, 
that is, Lambda is zero for all cases were we to use arbitration winner to pre-
dict case disposition. This measure is insensitive to the rare numbers of out-
comes that drive Professor LeRoy’s story. A measure more favorable to his 
case is Somers’ D which counts concordance and discordance among pairs of 
cases. Concordance occurs when the direction of change among one variable, 
arbitration winner, is the same direction as change for the other variable, case 
disposition. Like a correlation, Somers’ D ranges from complete discordance, -
1, to complete concordance, +1, with zero indicating no relationship. The posi-
tive direction is considered going down or to the right in the tables. Conse-
quently, positive values of Somers’ D indicate that employee-won arbitrations 
are more likely to be vacated and employer-won arbitrations are more likely to 
be confirmed. Values of Somers’ D for Tables 1–4 are -.0065, .0795, .0091, and 
.2453. So, only in the case of Table 4 is the strength of the relationship any-
thing other than minuscule. The bottom line is that a layperson’s intuition is 
correct here; four or five cases over thirty-three years do not make for a very 
strong effect. 
 17. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 213 (1997); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Play-
ers, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Em-
ployment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 238 (1998); Lisa B. 
Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbi-
tration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873, 893 (2002). 
 18. LeRoy, supra note 1, at 1054. 
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His second proposal is that state and federal courts return 
to strict construction of the Federal Arbitration Act’s very li-
mited standards for judicial review of binding arbitration 
awards.19 There is no question that courts adhering exclusively 
to these standards would make it more difficult for both parties 
to overturn an award by eliminating grounds for vacatur such 
as an award contrary to public policy or in manifest disregard 
of the law.20  
However, there are three problems with using Professor 
LeRoy’s sample to support this proposal. First, we do not know 
the total number of employment arbitration awards and 
whether Professor LeRoy’s cases are representative. Second, 
the results may stem from a lack of employee resources rather 
than moral hazard for employers. Third, we do not know why 
employees and employers file motions to vacate, and they may 
have very different motivations leading to systematic differenc-
es in these two groups of cases. 
We do not have good national data regarding the underly-
ing population of employment arbitration cases from which this 
court sample is the very tip of the iceberg. In other words, we 
do not know what percentage of all employment arbitrations 
Professor LeRoy’s court sample represents. It is fair to say that 
this percentage would be very small, and probably less than 
one percent.21 In other words, the arbitration cases that end up 
 
 19. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) provides: 
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the 
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the 
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration— 
  (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means; 
  (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbi-
trators, or either of them; 
  (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to 
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any 
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been preju-
diced; or 
  (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the sub-
ject matter submitted was not made. 
 20. See LeRoy, supra note 1, at 1031–33. 
 21. For example, Elizabeth Hill reports that under the auspices of the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) alone, 429 awards were rendered be-
tween Nov. 5, 2000 and Sept. 1, 2002. Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbi-
tration: A Fair Forum at a Low Cost, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 9, 17 n.26 (2003). This 
is less than a two-year period. The AAA is only one of many providers, but it is 
a prominent one. Cf. Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: 
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in court are probably not representative of employment arbitra-
tion cases as a whole. Most employer lawyers generally know 
this, which makes a moral hazard effect even less likely to re-
sult in a motion to vacate the average employment arbitration 
award. 
Taking the sample at face value, it is fair to infer that it 
does not reflect the number of employees who would challenge 
adverse awards if they could, if they had counsel and the re-
sources. Most employees are in employment arbitration as the 
result of dismissal and have lost their income and have fewer 
resources than they would otherwise.22 As Professor LeRoy ob-
serves, employees are less likely than employers to challenge 
the finality of a binding arbitration award, because they are 
less able to get the assistance of counsel.23 In most cases, the 
amount in dispute is relatively small, and thus unlikely to at-
tract counsel on a contingent fee basis. What if employees were 
able to get counsel and challenge adverse awards more fre-
quently? For example, some have suggested that unions may 
 
The Growth and Impact of “Alternative Dispute Resolution”, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 843, 872 (2004) (calculating that AAA handled 136,613 to 
150,009 arbitration cases a year between 1999 and 2002); AM. ARBITRATION 
ASS’N, 2005 PRESIDENT’S LETTER & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 8 (2005), availa-
ble at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4301 (observing that by 2005, AAA’s an-
nual caseload had dropped to about 142,000, as compared to 159,000 cases in 
2004).  
Third party providers must disclose certain data pursuant to California 
state law. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2007). In an unpublished 
paper presented at the American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolu-
tion conference in 2005, we examined arbitration disclosure statements re-
flecting a two-year caseload of over 4,000 arbitrations, analysis of a sample of 
which reflected that 32%, or roughly 1280, were employment cases. Lisa 
Blomgren Bingham, Jean Sternlight, & John Healey, Arbitration Data Disclo-
sure in California: What we Have and What we Need (2005) (on file with au-
thor). A third-quarter 2008 AAA report listed over 22,000 cases, including em-
ployment, consumer, construction, and other forms of commercial arbitration. 
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CCP SECTION 1281.96 DATA COLLECTION REQUIRE-
MENTS 3209 (2008), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=5468. This re-
port includes both settled and awarded cases. See generally id. Thus, a com-
parison of Hill’s sample with these disclosures shows a rapid growth in 
employment arbitration as a category of cases.  
However, we have neither comprehensive data on compliance with these 
rules, nor systematic analyses of the contents of the disclosures. Assembling 
this data would be a daunting task, as the third-quarter 2008 AAA report was 
over 3200 pages long. 
 22. Employers may file arbitration claims against employees for matters 
such as return of unearned commissions or use of trade secrets. However, it is 
difficult to document the relative frequency of these claims. 
 23. LeRoy, supra note 1, at 1008 n.56. 
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create an associate member status for workers in nonunion fa-
cilities and provide representation services in employment ar-
bitration in exchange for membership dues.24 Professor LeRoy 
points to the federal district court data from Table 1, which 
shows no significant difference for employers and employees in 
vacated awards in their favor. Impliedly, moral hazard is ab-
sent in this case. Thus, if a change in access to counsel changed 
the pattern of motions to vacate, presumably the evidence upon 
which Professor LeRoy bases his moral hazard argument for 
motions to vacate could disappear. 
There is much to suggest that court decisions on motions to 
vacate employment arbitration awards are not typical of all the 
cases that go to arbitration, since only a very small number of 
those cases reach judicial review. If they are not typical, why 
are these cases in court? This analysis does not ask an impor-
tant question: Why do employers and employees file motions to 
vacate? Professor LeRoy’s analysis concludes that employers 
file as a result of moral hazard. 
However, we analyzed a sample of 48,000 mediation cases 
involving complaints of employment discrimination from the 
USPS REDRESS program.25 While these are clearly different 
circumstances (mediation as opposed to mandatory arbitration, 
and typically much smaller stakes), they do suggest that partic-
ipants think about the resolution of the case differently. We 
found managers are more likely to consider the problem entire-
ly resolved, while employees view it as only partially resolved 
at the end of mediation. Moreover, managers are more likely to 
view the case as resolved if they consider the process to be fair, 
while employees are more likely to consider it resolved if they 
view the outcome to be fair. This suggests employees and em-
ployers may be pursuing different goals when they file motions 
to vacate. To the extent that these behaviors operate here, it 
 
 24. Bingham, supra note 10, at 119 (arguing that unions could provide 
representation services in employment arbitration through associate-member 
status); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Changing Face of Collective Represen-
tation: The Future of Collective Bargaining, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 903, 929 
(2007) (“The AFL-CIO has seriously stepped up its associate membership pro-
gram, ‘Working America,’ which attempts to unite and motivate working 
people on larger social and political issues of common concern even if they do 
not currently work in a union workplace. The program currently has almost a 
million members.”).  
 25. Tina Nabatchi, Lisa Blomgren Bingham, & David H. Good, Organiza-
tional Justice and Workplace Mediation: A Six Factor Model, 18 INT’L J. CON-
FLICT MGMT. 148 (2007). 
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may suggest that employees more than employers are seeking 
another bite at the apple, and the courts are saying no. 
For all of these reasons, this sample does not support an 
inference that courts are creating moral hazard for employers 
at the level of a motion to vacate an arbitration award. 
III.  BANNING PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN 
EMPLOYMENT: A BETTER SOLUTION   
The true public policy problem inherent in binding predis-
pute employment arbitration is not moral hazard for employers 
at the stage of judicial review. The moral hazard arises from 
the mere existence of mandatory arbitration and employers’ 
power to design arbitration systems to their advantage free 
from any significant regulation.26 Using this ability, employers 
can give themselves “get out of jail free” cards to escape liabili-
ty under the public law of employment. It is precisely because 
the grounds for judicial review are already so limited, and be-
cause employees have few resources to pursue those grounds, 
that employers are pushing the envelope to create skewed arbi-
tration dispute system designs. Making it even harder to over-
turn skewed system designs in court, as Professor LeRoy advo-
cates, will not solve that problem. 
Up until recently, the major players in the field of arbitra-
tion have endeavored to use self-regulation to address abuses 
through voluntary protocols.27 These protocols provide proce-
dural protections in the form of rights to counsel, limited rea-
sonable discovery, participation in selection of the arbitrator, a 
reasoned decision, and other elements associated with proce-
dural due process of law. Some courts have cited such protocols 
as persuasive authority on the fairness of an arbitration 
process.28 Moreover, there is evidence that when a third party 
 
 26. See Bingham, supra note 2, at 231, 239–43, for a discussion of control 
over dispute system design and mandatory arbitration.  
 27. For example, see Am. Bar Ass’n, A Due Process Protocol for Mediation 
and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of the Employment Relation-
ship, GP|SOLO, http://www.abanet.org/genpractice/magazine/1997/fall-
bos/lab_emp.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009). 
 28. For a review and assessment of the Employment Protocol, see Richard 
A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten: Twenty Unresolved 
Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
165, 184–96 (2005); Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Pro-
tocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 369, 401–56 (2004); and Martin H. Ma-
lin, Due Process in Employment Arbitration: The State of the Law and the 
Need for Self-Regulation, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 363, 386–403 (2007). 
Professor Malin concludes that courts have abdicated their responsibility to 
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provider enforces the Employment Protocol as to cases it admi-
nisters, the pattern of arbitration outcomes changes in em-
ployees’ favor compared to a pre-protocol case sample; in other 
words, self-regulation can make a difference.29 However, proto-
cols are not law; their effectiveness is constrained by the wil-
lingness of parties voluntarily to comply. 
The better solution is to abandon the laissez-faire ap-
proach30 embodied in the Supreme Court’s arbitration juri-
sprudence since Gilmer.31 Clearly, the Supreme Court is not 
going to do this, so Congress is going to have to do it for them. 
The 110th Congress considered a variety of proposals to reverse 
through legislation the Supreme Court’s dramatic expansion of 
the FAA’s preemptive effect. One recent proposal was the Arbi-
tration Fairness Act of 2007.32 It would have amended the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act to provide:  
 
police arbitration agreements for fairness, and that self-regulation in the form 
of the major third-party-provider agencies such as AAA and JAMS refusing to 
administer skewed programs can go some distance to filling the gap. Malin, 
supra, at 403. 
 29. Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before 
and After the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory 
Disputes Arising Out of Employment: Preliminary Evidence That Self-
Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE 
EMPLOYMENT ARENA 303 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherugh eds., 2004). 
 30. See Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, the “National Policy” of the 
Supreme Court, 3 NEV. L.J. 259, 264 (2003) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s 
construction of the Federal Arbitration Act as permitting economic predators 
to contract out of the private system for law enforcement and “thereby expos-
ing consumers, employees, small businesses, and other persons of limited eco-
nomic bargaining power to a thousand wounds”). 
 31. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24–26 (1991) 
(enforcing an arbitration clause in a Securities and Exchange Commission reg-
istration form for an employment dispute on the theory that it was a change in 
forum not substance and federal policy supports arbitration). 
 32. H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007). This bill contains findings including: 
  (1) The Federal Arbitration Act (now enacted as chapter 1 of title 
9 of the United States Code) was intended to apply to disputes be-
tween commercial entities of generally similar sophistication and 
bargaining power. 
  (2) A series of United States Supreme Court decisions have 
changed the meaning of the Act so that it now extends to disputes be-
tween parties of greatly disparate economic power, such as consumer 
disputes and employment disputes. As a result, a large and rapidly 
growing number of corporations are requiring millions of consumers 
and employees to give up their right to have disputes resolved by a 
judge or jury, and instead submit their claims to binding arbitration. 
  (3) Most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful 
option whether to submit their claims to arbitration. Few people real-
ize, or understand the importance of the deliberately fine print that 
strips them of rights; and because entire industries are adopting 
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No predispute arbitration agreement33 shall be valid or en-
forceable if it requires arbitration of— 
‘(1) an employment,34 consumer,35 or franchise dispute;36 or 
‘(2) a dispute arising under any statute intended to protect 
civil rights or to regulate contracts or transactions between 
parties of unequal bargaining power.37 
The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 is under considera-
tion in the current session of Congress.38 Its most recent ver-
sion addresses technical concerns by placing its provisions in a 
new Chapter 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act and defining the 
terms related to arbitration of franchise, employee, consumer, 
and civil rights claims.39 
 
these clauses, people increasingly have no choice but to accept them. 
They must often give up their rights as a condition of having a job, 
getting necessary medical care, buying a car, opening a bank account, 
getting a credit card, and the like. Often times, they are not even 
aware that they have given up their rights. 
Id. § 2(1)–(3). 
 33.  The bill defines “pre-dispute arbitration agreement” to mean “any 
agreement to arbitrate disputes that had not yet arisen at the time of the 
making of the agreement.” Id. § 3(6). 
 34. The bill defines “employment dispute” as “a dispute between an em-
ployer and employee arising out of the relationship of employer and employee 
as defined by the Fair Labor Standards Act.” Id. 
 35. The bill defines “consumer dispute” as “a dispute between a person 
other than an organization who seeks or acquires real or personal property, 
services, money, or credit for personal, family, or household purposes and the 
seller or provider of such property, services, money, or credit.” Id. § 3(4). 
 36. The bill defines a “franchise dispute” as “a dispute between a franchi-
sor and franchisee arising out of or relating to contract or agreement by 
which⎯ 
  (A) a franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of 
offering, selling, or distributing goods or services under a marketing 
plan or system prescribed in substantial part by a franchisor; 
  (B) the operation of the franchisee's business pursuant to such 
plan or system is substantially associated with the franchisor's 
trademark, service mark, trade name, logotype, advertising, or other 
commercial symbol designating the franchisor or its affiliate; and 
  (C) the franchisee is required to pay, directly or indirectly, a fran-
chise fee . . . . 
Id. § 3(5). 
 37. Id. § 4(4)(b). 
 38. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009). Senator 
Russell Feingold introduced the bill on April 29, 2009; it hassince been re-
ferred to the Committee on the Judiciary. 
 39. See, e.g., id. § 401 (defining “consumer dispute,” “employment dis-
pute,” and “predispute arbitration agreement” while exempting collective bar-
gaining agreements). 
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This legislative approach amends the FAA to carve out ex-
ceptions from its coverage. Another example is the proposed 
Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2008,40 which 
would carve out predispute arbitration agreements involving 
long-term care.41 One bill would provide for fairness in lives-
tock and poultry contracts.42 
An alternative approach is to enact separate legislation to 
address a category of cases without directly amending the FAA. 
One proposal would make mandatory arbitration clauses in 
consumer contracts an unfair and deceptive practice.43 Another 
would prohibit mandatory arbitration in homebuilding con-
tracts.44 Yet another would prohibit mandatory arbitration in 
 
 40. H.R. 6126, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 41. The Act provides in relevant part:  
(b) INVALIDITY OF PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS.—A pre-
dispute arbitration agreement between a long-term care facility and a 
resident of such facility (or person acting on behalf of such resident, 
including a person with financial responsibility for such resident) 
shall not be valid or specifically enforceable. 
Id. 
 42. Fair Contracts for Growers Act, S. 221, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007). It pro-
vides in relevant part:  
(b) CONSENT TO ARBITRATION.—If a livestock or poultry contract pro-
vides for the use of arbitration to resolve a controversy under the li-
vestock or poultry contract, arbitration may be used to settle the con-
troversy only if, after the controversy arises, both parties consent in 
writing to use arbitration to settle the controversy. 
Id. 
 43. Consumer Fairness Act, H.R. 1443, 110th Cong. § 1003 (2007). This 
proposal would amend the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 
and provides in relevant part:  
  (a) IN GENERAL.—A written provision in any consumer transac-
tion or consumer contract which requires binding arbitration (wheth-
er by the terms of such transaction or contract directly or at the re-
quest of any party to the transaction or contract) to resolve any 
controversy arising out of or related to the transaction or contract, or 
the failure to perform the whole or any part of the transaction or con-
tract shall constitute a violation of this title, shall not be enforceable, 
and shall be treated as an unfair and deceptive trade act or practice 
under Federal or State law. 
  (b) POST-CONTROVERSY AGREEMENTS.—Subsection (a) shall not 
apply with respect to a written agreement to determine by binding 
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of a consumer transac-
tion or consumer contract if the written agreement has been entered 
into by the parties to the consumer transaction or consumer contract 
after the controversy has arisen. 
Id. 
 44. American Homebuyers Protection Act, H.R. 1519, 110th Cong. (2007). 
It provides in part: 
(a) In General- No person engaged in the construction of new houses 
may require a purchaser to enter into a mandatory arbitration 
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predatory tax refund anticipation loans.45 These independent 
exceptions are viewed by arbitration proponents as raising few-
er political problems than an actual amendment of the FAA. 
Advocates of mandatory arbitration insist that eliminating 
predispute arbitration clauses will sound the death knell for 
any reasonably inexpensive and prompt access to justice for 
employment disputes, primarily because lawyers will not agree 
to arbitration on behalf of their clients after the fact.46 
However, there is another approach: a post-dispute opt out 
provision. Under this approach, both parties could enter into a 
predispute arbitration agreement, but that agreement would 
specifically permit a party to opt out of arbitration once the 
dispute arises. The federal courts have substantial experience 
using “opt out” rules in their court-annexed alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) programs. Program evaluations conducted in 
collaboration with the Federal Judicial Center show a consis-
tent pattern: participation rates in programs with an opt out 
clause are almost as high as participation rates in mandatory 
court ADR programs.47  
 
agreement as a condition precedent to entering into a contract for the 
purchase of a new house. 
Id. § 2. 
 45. Taxpayer Abuse Prevention Act, S. 1133, 110th Cong. (2007). It pro-
vides in part:  
(a) In General- Any person that provides a loan to a taxpayer that is 
linked to or in anticipation of a Federal tax refund for the taxpayer 
may not include mandatory arbitration of disputes as a condition for 
providing such a loan.  
Id. § 4. 
 46. See, e.g., Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire: The 
Feasibility of Post-Dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM. MIT-
CHELL L. REV. 313, 314 (2003) (reporting that only six percent of all employ-
ment arbitration cases handled by the AAA arise out of post-dispute arbitra-
tion agreements); David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute 
Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with 
Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 1, 7 (2003) (arguing that lawyers for employers will not agree to postdispute 
arbitration). 
 47. See DAVID RAUMA & CAROL KRAFKA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, VO-
LUNTARY ARBITRATION IN EIGHT FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: AN EVALUATION 
17 (1994), http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS49863 (finding similar participa-
tion rates in three of the four voluntary courts with opt-out procedures to 
courts with mandatory referral); see also ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA 
STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 6 (Fed-
eral Judicial Center 1996) (finding similar participation rates in ADR between 
opt-out programs and mandatory programs). 
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  CONCLUSION   
There are a variety of approaches, or combinations of ap-
proaches, to addressing the public policy problem posed by 
mandatory arbitration and its abuses. Any of these would get to 
the heart of the problem. That problem is not moral hazard 
created by courts at the point where employers file a motion to 
vacate; the greater temptation for employers is to develop a 
plan that is so skewed in the first instance that employees lose 
and are discouraged from ever going to court. We need to regu-
late employers’ abuse of control over dispute system design and 
restore the reputation of arbitration as a fair, efficient, and cost 
effective alternative to the public justice system. 
